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CASE COMMENTS
THE RIGHT OF AN ADOPTED CHILD TO SUCCEED TO AN
ESTATE LIMITED TO THE HEIRS OF HIS FOSTER
PARENT
A deeded land to B, his daughter, for her natural life, then to her
"heirs" in fee simple. Forty years after the conveyance and five
years before the death of B, she and her husband legally adopted C
as their heir, with the right of inheriting from them the same as if he
had been the issue of marriage. C attempted by this action to be
adjudged the sole owner of the land, there being no other children of
B and her husband. Held: The grantor did not intend to embrace in
the term "heirs" a stranger in blood thereafter adopted by his daugh-
ter, and such adopted child does not take. Woods v. Crump, 283 Ky.
675, 142 S. W. (2d) 680 (1940).*
Adoption establishes a status, and it has been defined to be the
act by which relation of paternity and affiliation are recognized as
legally existing between persons not so related by nature, or as the
taking into one's family the child of another as son and heir, and
conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of a natural child?
The adoption theory, although stated repeatedly in the cases to be a
concept unknown to our common law ancestors, was known to the
ancients of Greece and Rome and probably to other ancient peoples,
being practiced among continental nations under the civil law from
remotest antiquity? Furthermore, the custom of adoption was fol-
lowed by the American Indians and was observed by the performance
of either of two rites, baptism or the transfusion of blood.'
* The adoption statutes were repealed by the legislature in
1940, Acts of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth, Chapter
94, page 376 (1940).
'Sheffield v. Franklin, 151 Ala. 492, 44 So. 373 (1907); Morris-
son v. Sessions, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N. W. 249 (1888).
' Non-she-po v. Wa-win-ta, 37 Ore. 213, 62 Pac. 15 (1900).
"Supra, note 1 and 2.
'Smith, Our Western Border, pg. 76 (1914). Colonel Smith
described his adoption into an Indian tribe as follows: "At length one
of the chiefs made a speech, which was delivered to me by an inter-
preter, and was as foloweth: 'My son, yow are now flesh of our flesh,
and bone of our bone. By the ceremony which was performed this
day, every drop of white blood was washed out of your viens; .
after what has happened this day you are now one of us by an old
strong law and custom. My son, you have nothing to fear; we are
now under the same obligations to love, support and defend you, that
we are to love, support and defend one another; therefore, you are to
consider yourself as one of our people'."
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The statute in Kentucky on the process of adoption is as fol-
lows:5
"Any person twenty-one years of age, may, by petition filed
in the circuit court of the county of his residence, state, in sub-
stance, that he is desirous of adopting a person, and making
him capable' of inheriting as heir-at-law of such petitioner;
and said court shall have authority to make an order declaring
such person heir-at-law of such petitioner, and as such, capable
of inheriting as though such person were the child of such peti-
tioner; but no such order shall be made if the petitioner be a
married man or woman, unless the husband or wife join in the
petition."
Under section 20721 the legislature further provides that,
if said child shall die intestate, any property owned
by such child so adopted at the time of the death of such
child shall descend under the intestate laws of this state in the
same manner as if the child were the natural child of those who
adopted it, except such property, if any, which it may have
inherited from its blood relations."
Thus where an adopted child dies intestate leaving property not
inherited from its blood relations and his nearest foster kindred is his
grandfather by adoption, the grandfather by adoption will take the
property.
After examining the two statutes one might conclude that in Ken-
tucky an adopted child should inherit from its foster parent's kindred
as they take from the adopted child any property not inherited from
its blood relations. But the court in Merrit v. Mortowe held that an
adopted child could not inherit from kindred of its foster parents, for
the act of the foster parent in adopting the child is a contract into
which they entered with those having the lawful custody of the child;
an agreement personal to themselves. While they have a perfect
right to bind themselves to make the child their heir, they are power-
less to extend this right on his part to inherit from others. Vernier
has criticized this construction of such a statute for it makes the
legislation one-sided; but such is the law in Kentucky today.,
The decision in the Merrit case prompted the holding in Sanders
v. Adams9 that where a foster father's parent devised land to his
child for the child's natural life and then to the "children" of the life
tenant, the adopted child of the life tenant could not inherit from its
foster father's parent because the latter was not a party to the con-
tract of adoption. But in this case the remaindermen took by purchase
and not by inheritance. This result, however, is in accord with the
holdings of a majority of the courts in that they are disposed to con-
"Kentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1936) sec. 2071.
6 Kentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1936).
7 143 Ky. 133, 136 S. W. 133 (1911). Also see Brooks Bank and
Trust Co. v. Rorabacher, 171 Atl. 655, 118 Conn. 202 (1934); Grimes
v. Grimes, 207 N. C. 778, 178 S. E. 573 (1935).
'4 Vernier, American Family Laws, sections 262 and 263 (1936).
'278 Ky. 24, 128 S. W. (2d) 223 (1939).
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fine the word "children" to its natural import, it being observed that
the word "children" and not "heirs" was used; thus, they exclude
adopted children.1 The Sanders case is the only Kentucky decision
cited by the court in Woods v. Crump where the adopted child's claim
was based on purchase rather than on descent. There seems to be
perceptible here a strange confusion between acquisition by descent
and acquisition by purchase. For example, A dies intestate and only
two people claim to take his estate, B and C. B is a natural child of
a child and C is an adopted child of a child. Under the theory set
forth in Merritt v. Morton, B will take the property because an
adopted child can not inherit from kindred of his foster parents.
A different problem is presented where A leaves property by will
to X, his daughter, for her natural life and at her death to her heirs
in fee simple. The heirs do not take by descent but rather by pur-
chase and to say that C can not take under the will because he has
been adopted and therefore can not inherit from kindred of its foster
parents is a non sequitur. In Illinois where the adoption statutes are
similar to those of Kentucky, the court held that a deed conveying a
remainder in fee to the "heirs generally" of a life tenant, if he should
die leaving no child, gives the remainder to an adopted child, such
child being the only statutory heir of the foster parents.' In that
case the term "heirs" was defined as those "who succeed to the intes-
tate's property," and it was held that in the absence of a contrary
intention the words of the deed should be construed in their ordinary
meaning. The court treated the adopted child as taking by purchase
and not by descent saying the question was one of the intention of the
grantor.
The recent case, Woods v. Crump, involved a transfer of real
estate to B for life, remainder to the "heirs" of B. B left as her only
heir an adopted child C. The problem is not the adopted child's right
to inherit from the grantor, rather the issue is whether the adoption
statute in Kentucky is sufficiently broad to include an adopted child
where there is a gift of the remainder to the "heirs" of the life
tenant. The precise question, the court says is whether or not the
grantor intended to embrace within the term "heirs" a child who
might later be adopted by the life tenant. It must be remembered
that there has been no express declaration of the intention of the
grantor and any attempt to determine his intention is conjectural.
This inquiry as to the grantor's fictitious intention should be answered
by the reading of the entire deed in the light of the statute. In the
absence of facts showing a different intention, the grantor is pre-
sumed to have used words in their ordinary sense.P The Kentucky
court held that C did not take because the grantor did not intend to
include a subsequently adopted child in the term "heirs". It cited
- 2 C. J. S. 455 (1936).
'Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N. E. 602 (1900). See
note (1920) 5 A. L. R. 1282.
1 Supra, note 9.
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an Ohio decision holding that the term "heirs" as used in a deed to
describe the remaindermen, included an adopted child of the life
tenant' It was presumed in that case that the grantor intended the
words in the deed should have their ordinary meaning, nd that to
exclude an adopted child the grantor would have to do so expressly.
The Kentucky court said that the Ohio statute on adoption"' was much
broader than the Kentucky provision and that the cases were dis-
tinguishable. It is submitted that the Statute in Kentucky is suffi-
ciently broad to include an adopted child in a deed where the remain-
dermen are described as "her heirs". It must be admitted that the
adopted child is an heir of the foster parent. Suppose A conveys
land to B, a stranger, for his life and at B's death to B's heirs. B has
an adopted child, his only heir-at-law, who claims the land. The
Kentucky court could scarcely hold that the adopted child did not
take the land, because by the statutory provisions Of this 'Common-
wealth the adopted child is the heir of the fosterparent. Should it
make any difference if A is the adopted child's foster father's parent?
It seems difficult to frame language more direct and expressive than
that used in the Kentucky Statute showing the intention to place an
adopted child upon an absolute equality with natural children. Cer-
tainly the grantor, in the principal case, should be presumed to know
that it was possible for the life tenant to adopt a child and that such
child would be an heir of the life tenant. It is submitted that the
fictitious intent of the grantor should not be allowed to overrule the
ordinary interpretation of the words of the deed.
When the court supplied words limiting succession to the
daughter's heirs-at-law, who should be of her blood, it amended
rather than construed the deed. The word "heirs" has an ascer-
tained meaning, and here scarcely requires interpretation. There
being nothing in other portions of the deed to indicate that the word
"heirs" was not used in its ordinary sense, the court departed from
,that primarily meaning of the term for the purpose of giving effect
to what it guessed was the intention of the grantor, feeling perhaps
that such a departure constituted a fairer distribution of the prop-
erty. The grantor should have expressly limited the remaindermen
to heirs of the daughter's blood if he intended this result.
j. GRANILLE CLARK
CAN A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY WHO IS NOT A PAYEE
ENFORCE A CONTRACT FOR HIS BENEFIT?
In contemplation of divorce, H, the husband, made a valid con-
tract with W, his wife, providing that he would pay her a certain
sum monthly for the support and maintenance of their children
23 Laws v. Davis, 34 Ohio App. 157, 170 N. E. 601 (1930).
"I. . the adopted child shall stand in the same relation for
all purposes to such declarant as he or she would be in if they were
a child born in lawful wedlock . . .", as cited in Laws v. Davis,
supra note 13.
